

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 234576

60

ORIGIN SS-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSC-05 /020 R

66610

DRAFTED BY: S/S-O:GTWOHIE

APPROVED BY: S/S-O:GTWOHIE

S/S:MR MOFFAT

DIST: S/S, NSCE

----- 110996

O 242012Z OCT 74 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 234576

LIMDIS - TOSEC 89

FOLLOWING REPEAT JERUSALEM 1860 ACTION SECSTATE INFO AMMAN
BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV 24 OCT

QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L JERUSALEM 1860

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PBOR, PFOR, JO, IS

SUBJ: POSSIBILITY OF ISRAELI-WEST BANK ACCORD

SUMMARY. WE SEE NO REAL CHANCE ISRAELIS CAN AT THIS STAGE CREATE
WEST BANK LEADERSHIP WITH WHICH THEY COULD NEGOTIATE SEPARATE
SETTLEMENT. ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL WEST BANK LEADERS WOULD DISTRUST
ULTIMATE ISRAELI INTENTION TO WITHDRAW, WOULD FEEL THEY WERE
BEING USED IN ISRAELI MANEUVER AGAINST PLO AND ARAB GOVERNMENTS,
AND WOULD REALIZE ISRAEL WOULD NOT RETURN ENOUGH TERRITORY
(ESPECIALLY IN JERUSALEM) TO JUSTIFY THEIR STICKING THEIR NECKS
OUT. WEST BANKERS MOREOVER WOULD NOT BE ATTRACTED BY ARRANGEMENT
THAT WOULD AMOUNT, IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, TO THEIR RESIGNING FROM
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 234576

THE ARAB WORLD. END SUMMARY.

1. THERE HAVE BEEN INTIMATIONS FROM ISRAELI LEADERSHIP (ALLON'S OCT 21 KNESSET SPEECH) THAT IF ARAB SUMMIT DOESN'T PRODUCE "WORKABLE" RESULT, ISRAEL MAY PROCEED TO WORK OUT SOME FORM OF SETTLEMENT WITH WEST BANK ARABS. WE ASSUME THIS IN PART AT LEAST INTENDED AS THREAT TO ARABS ASSEMBLING IN RABAT. TO EXTENT ISRAELIS MAY BELIEVE IT IS PRACTICAL POSSIBILITY, HOWEVER, WE THINK THEY ARE DELUDING THEMSELVES.

2. WE HAVE REPORTED FROM TIME TO TIME EFFORTS BY ISRAELIS TO INTEREST WEST BANK LEADERS IN TAKING OVER ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF WEST BANK WHILE ISRAEL KEPT SECURITY FUNCTION. WE ASSUME THIS IS WHAT PERES DISCUSSED RECENTLY WITH ANWAR KHATIB (JERUSALEM 1740). SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT IS OBVIOUSLY DIFFERENT FROM ONE IN WHICH ISRAEL PROPOSES TO TURN OVER SOME PORTION OF WEST BANK TOTALLY TO ARAB CONTROL. LATTER WOULD THEORETICALLY BE FAR MORE ATTRACTIVE, BUT IT NEVERTHELESS HAS FATAL PROBLEMS (EVEN ASSUMING IMMENSE DIFFICULTY OF PULLING DISPARATE WEST BANKERS INTO DECISION-MAKING BODY COULD BE OVERCOME).

3. A PRIMARY DIFFICULTY IS DEEP ARAB DISTRUST OF ISRAELI MOTIVES AND INTENTIONS. IF WEST BANK NOTABLES WERE GENUINELY CONVINCED THAT ISRAEL INTENDED TO WITHDRAW, THEY MIGHT ENTERTAIN THE IDEA. KHATIB RECOUNTED THAT PERES ASKED HIM WHAT GOI COULD DO TO INDUCE HIM TO PLAY LEADERSHIP ROLE, AND HE ANSWERED "WITHDRAW". BUT ISRAELIS WILL CLEARLY NOT OPEN DIALOG BY MAKING FIRM COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW AT EARLY DATE AND NOTHING LESS WOULD BE CONVINCING. IF NOTHING ELSE, ARABS KNOW STRENGTH OF ISRAELI INTERNAL OPPOSITION TO WITHDRAWAL AND WOULD BE HIGHLY SKEPTICAL OF GOI'S ABILITY TO ABANDON WEST BANK EVEN IF IT WANTED TO.

4. ARABS WOULD THEREFORE SEE THEMSELVES BEING SUCKED INTO POSITION OF GREAT RISK POLITICALLY, EVEN PHYSICALLY, ONLY TO BE LEFT WITHOUT THE FULFILLMENT THAT WOULD BE CONCEIVABLE JUSTIFICATION FOR THEIR ACTIONS.

5. LOCAL ARAB LEADERSHIP WOULD REALIZE THAT "INDEPENDENT" WEST BANK, BORN IN THIS WAY, WOULD BE CUT OFF FROM ARAB WORLD. MANY LEADERS, MOREOVER, HAVE MORE OR LESS GENUINE LOYALTIES EITHER TO PLO OR HASHEMITES, AND UNLESS THEY WERE CONVINCED BOTH OPTIONS WERE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 234576

PERMANENTLY RULED OUT THEY WOULD NOT ABANDON THEM. AT THIS STAGE THEY WOULD LIKELY NOT BE SO CONVINCED AND WOULD FEEL THEY WERE BEING USED IN ISRAELI MANEUVER AGAINST PLO AND ARAB GOVERNMENTS.

6. FINALLY, AND PROBABLY DECISIVELY, IS FACT THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT TURN OVER ENOUGH TERRITORY TO JUSTIFY WEST BANKERS' "DEFECTION" AND WEST BANKERS KNOW IT. TO MAKE DEAL WITHOUT JERUSALEM IS CON-

SIDERED IMPOSSIBLE FOR HUSSEIN, HOW MUCH MORE SO FOR WEST BANK
LEADERS. KHATIB IS HIMSELF JERUSALEMITE. WHILE ISRAEL MIGHT
CONCEIVABLY MAKE CONCESSIONS ON JERUSALEM AT END OF LONG
NEGOTIATIONS WITH FULL PANOPLY OF ARAB FORCES, ETC., GOI COULD
HARDLY DO SO IN ARRANGEMENT IT WAS IN EFFECT DICTATING TO
CAPTIVE ARABS.
DAY UNQUOTE INGERSOLL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: AGREEMENTS, PEACE TALKS, NEGOTIATIONS, TOSEC 89
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 24 OCT 1974
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: shawdg
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974STATE234576
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: O:GTWOHIE
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740304-0313
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19741019/aaaaaplwtel
Line Count: 122
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: shawdg
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 12 JUN 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <12 JUN 2002 by boyleja>; APPROVED <11 MAR 2003 by shawdg>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: POSSIBILITY OF ISRAELI-WEST BANK ACCORD SUMMARY. WE SEE NO REAL CHANCE ISRAELIS CAN AT THIS STAGE CREATE
TAGS: PBOR, PFOR, JO, IS
To: MOSCOW
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005